

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

OCT 31 1969

ENDC/PV.430
21 August 1969
ENGLISH

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS

(Argentina)

GE.69-19308

69-35517

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS

Mr. A.F. DUMONT

Mr. O. SARACHO

Brazil:

Mr. S.A. FRAZAO

Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO

Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Mr. M. DARCY de OLIVEIRA

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Mr. R.W. CLARK

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. J. CINGROS

Ethiopia:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. I. SARKADI

Mr. J. PETRAN

Mr. S. HAJNAL

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

Mr. N. KRISHNAN

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO

Mr. F.L. OTTIERI

Mr. R. BORSARELLI

Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. K. ASAKAI

Mr. T. SENGOKU

Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mr. M. WATANABE

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTENEDA

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN

Mr. Z. ERENDQO

Morocco:

Mr. A. CHERKAOUI

Mr. A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER

Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST

Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Pakistan:

Mr. A. SHAHI

Mr. K. AHMED

Poland:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. H. STEPESZ

Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. MITRAN
Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. T. BENGTSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. Y. RIZK

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. N. COTTON
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Argentina) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the 430th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): We should like on this occasion to make some comments on the general process of nuclear disarmament. We do so with some hesitation. Usually we prefer to speak on particular topics, such as the demilitarization of the sea-bed or the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons, in which our participation can be more specific and constructive. But we believe it is a duty of each and all of us to express also an opinion on the present situation of the overall problem of disarmament and on certain dangerous tendencies which have been taking shape recently.
3. It can be said without any exaggeration that the past year has been the most unproductive and frustrating where disarmament is concerned. Here, unfortunately, not to advance is to recede. Technology is advancing, weapons are being improved day by day and obstacles go on accumulating. Time, by itself, is certainly not working in favour of peace. When we see how, time and again, there have been postponements not only of the conclusion of agreements but even of the beginning of negotiations which the parties themselves and the rest of the world consider to be urgent, we are assailed by the feeling that an historic opportunity is being almost irretrievably lost.
4. In July 1968 the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) was opened for signature and President Johnson announced that the Soviet Union was ready to hold bilateral talks for the limitation of nuclear weapon vehicles or, to use the official phrase, for the limitation of strategic weapons. But more than a year later these talks, now known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), have still not been started and we do not know for certain when they will begin. This has virtually paralysed any attempt to make progress on any other aspect of nuclear disarmament.
5. In the Committee on Disarmament -- which would be the appropriate forum for it -- there has not been for a long time, for instance, a single move which could be likened to a beginning of negotiation concerning cessation of the production of nuclear weapons or of fissionable materials or concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

weapons. Certainly willingness to reach agreements has been expressed and even working papers have been submitted in connexion with those subjects. But those documents have served as restatements of the respective positions of the two great Powers rather than as a basis for negotiation. In any case -- and this is an undeniable fact -- they have not given rise to negotiations or even to a genuine discussion in the Disarmament Committee.

6. Even in regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests the respective positions of the two super-Powers concerning verification and control seem to be immobilized and crystallized despite the enormous progress which has been made by their own scientists during the past decade in the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. This immobility seems all the more incomprehensible when countries such as Sweden, Canada and Japan, which have vast experience in these matters and have always acted so seriously, have put forward various solutions and formulas which would make it possible to overcome the problem of on-site control. Nevertheless, those efforts have not succeeded in generating a process of discussion or of possible rapprochement of the respective positions -- in other words, real negotiation.

7. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in addition to real and honest differences of opinion on the problem of control and verification, the two great Powers feel some reluctance to stop those tests in the absence of other related, and possibly more comprehensive, agreements. As I have said, on each and every aspect of nuclear disarmament there has been an almost complete halt in negotiations. Everything seems to depend on possible agreement on the limitation of nuclear missiles. We are all wondering whether this dependence and the postponement of all negotiation on nuclear disarmament are really justified. In truth, we do not know. What is certain is that in these matters the great Powers have committed on more than one occasion serious errors of judgement, which they have recognized in the course of time. But even if it were necessary to link these negotiations together, that would be an additional reason for speeding their initiation.

8. In the nineteenth century it used to be said that time was the best solution for international problems. Certainly the same cannot be said about the problems of disarmament, and especially of nuclear disarmament. The circumstances are generally

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

more propitious for an agreement earlier rather than later. The talks on the limitation of vehicles carrying nuclear weapons were postponed first of all because of the events in Czechoslovakia a year ago and the consequent deterioration of political relations. Then there was the change of administration in the United States and the need to re-examine the previous positions. Then there arose doubts, vacillation and changing attitudes on one side or the other, perhaps because of the mutual desire to begin the talks in more favourable circumstances. What is certain is that so far a mutually-satisfactory time to begin the talks has not been found.

9. For the rest of the world the upsurge of political problems connected with disarmament which disturb the relations between the two interlocutors does not seem to be sufficient cause to postpone the process of negotiation. We cannot accept that the problem is a purely bilateral one, although we realize that it affects the two great Powers more than the other States. Since many non-nuclear countries have renounced the right to possess atomic weapons, they in their turn are entitled to be relieved of the danger of a direct nuclear confrontation between the two great Powers which would cover the whole world. Needless to say, such a danger is inherent in the arms race to the highest degree. Those Powers are therefore responsible to the world for their own disarmament. The proof that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have a universal obligation is that they undertook formally and categorically ergo omnes, in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons -- "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date ..." (ENDC/226*).

10. The delay in concluding agreements on nuclear disarmament would be regrettable at any time, but in the present situation it is particularly serious. The progress achieved in technology has made it possible to put a brake on the nuclear race at the present time, but perhaps this will not be possible later on. This is the opinion of someone than whom there could hardly be a higher authority. I am referring to our former colleague, Mr. William Foster. In an important study published a few months ago on the prospects for the control of armaments Mr. Foster says that the technological stars and planets are now in a favourable conjunction, but will not remain in that position for very long.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

11. The reasons for the present favourable conjunction, however ephemeral, are two. First, the possibilities for verification of nuclear disarmament by purely national methods are apparently much greater than it has so far been possible to reveal. The second reason is that the two parties are now in a situation of relative equilibrium. According to authoritative estimates, each of the two great Powers, even after taking the first blow, could retaliate and probably inflict upon the other about 100 million casualties. The reason is -- and this seems to be the gist of the whole question -- that neither of the two parties has the capacity to deliver a first surprise blow that could annihilate the adversary. It is this horrifying capacity of mutual deterrence that provides a certain degree of stability.

12. This equilibrium is, however, a precarious one. Any chance discovery, an accelerated advance, or a lag either in offensive or defensive weapons by one or other of the two parties could change the situation. Moreover -- and this is fundamental -- any unfounded belief, any misjudgement concerning the present or future capacity of the adversary or even concerning his intentions, could upset this very unstable situation and plunge the world into the abyss, or at least give rise to a new spiral in the mounting arms race.

13. In the light of experience in the recent past it must be acknowledged that the prospect of a worsening of the present situation is very great. It is common knowledge that both parties are working feverishly on the development of both defensive anti-ballistic missile systems and multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV). If history is to provide a lesson, it is not impossible even that each of these parallel efforts of the two parties is a reaction, perhaps excessive, perhaps unnecessary, to an initiative of the adversary which may not have been weighed and evaluated with the necessary strictness. In any case, what is serious is this: according to the experts, once the MIRVs are placed in position operationally it will be impossible to carry out effective control and verification without a complicated and rigorous inspection at the launching sites themselves. That could mean the indefinite postponement of any agreement on nuclear disarmament.

14. That is why it is indispensable and urgent, not only that the United States and the Soviet Union should start to hold their talks on the limitation of strategic weapons

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

very soon, but also that in some way, until an agreement is reached, any substantial change should be prevented in the basic equilibrium of forces which exists today -- in other words, in the capacity of mutual deterrence which the two Powers have in sufficient degree.

15. That is why we believe that it would be highly desirable and in fact indispensable that from the beginning of the SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union both parties should accept a moratorium of two or three years, which could be renewable, concerning the adoption of any new measures capable of altering the precarious equilibrium which seems to exist today. The Mexican delegation feels that the United Nations General Assembly, as the most representative body of the international community, could and should address an urgent appeal to the United States and the Soviet Union in this sense. Although the negotiation itself concerns them alone, the responsibility for nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of all mankind. If other delegations, and in particular those of any of the twelve non-aligned countries, think in the same way, the Mexican delegation will be ready to join them in order to present a joint initiative in this sense to the Committee on Disarmament.

16. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): At the outset I should like to take this opportunity to associate myself with those speakers who have preceded me in welcoming the distinguished representatives of the six new member countries, Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. My delegation, which is also a new one, looks forward to benefiting from their co-operation and it is confident that the new members will contribute greatly to achieving our common goal.

17. Today the Mongolian delegation wishes to state briefly its views on some topical problems in the field of nuclear disarmament which are under discussion in this Committee.

18. We have already stated on a number of occasions both here in this Committee and at General Assembly sessions that it is the considered view of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic that general and complete disarmament should start with nuclear disarmament. First and foremost there should be eliminated those weapons whose stockpiling -- not to mention their use -- poses an ever-increasing threat to the very existence of mankind. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

persistently supported with concrete actions all the measures directed towards achieving this vital goal. My delegation is happy to inform the members of the Committee that one of the latest actions of my Government in this regard was the deposition of the instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) on 14 May in Moscow.

19. We consider that Treaty a significant factor, facilitating the reduction and consequent cessation of the nuclear arms race and the creation of favourable conditions for taking new measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. My delegation, like many others, believes that the most important task before us today is to ensure that the Treaty enters into force without delay. We are satisfied that this process, though somewhat slow, is steadily going on. However, we share the serious concern that has been expressed here over the fact that a number of countries -- including some of the so-called near-nuclear States -- are still temporizing in acceding to this important international agreement. My delegation therefore fully supports the suggestion made by the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the effect that the Committee recommend to the General Assembly that it should, in a specific appeal, urge the States concerned to work towards the Treaty's speedy entry into force (ENDC/PV.423, para. 25).

20. My delegation fully shares the view of the delegation of the Polish People's Republic that the continued viability of the non-proliferation Treaty is vitally linked with reaching agreement on two extremely important problems, namely, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the cessation of underground tests of those weapons (ENDC/PV.399, para. 56).

21. As to the problem of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, its positive solution would constitute a decisive step towards outlawing these means of mass annihilation.

22. The comprehensive ban on the use of nuclear weapons would, among other things, provide an additional guarantee of the security of all States, whether large or small. Moreover, such a ban would prepare the ground for the measures to be taken with a view to stopping the production of nuclear weapons, reducing their stockpiles and eventually completely prohibiting and eliminating those weapons under appropriate international control. That is why the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic fully endorsed

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

the initiative taken by the Soviet Government in submitting to the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. That act meets the interests and aspirations of all peoples and forces working to save mankind from the threat of a **thermonuclear catastrophe**.

23. It is a matter of deep regret that this vital question has not yet been positively solved. The fault lies squarely with those who have taken a negative stand on this issue, ignoring the security interests of mankind. My delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament should give the highest priority to the specific consideration of this question, having in mind its particular urgency, and should exert every effort to work out a treaty on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the draft that has already been submitted.

24. I should like now to make some brief remarks on the question of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. I shall not dwell at length on how closely that question is linked with the problem of the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty or with the **forthcoming** talks between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive strategic weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. I should like only to dwell very briefly on the problem of underground nuclear-weapon tests.

25. Some people believe that that problem is aggravated by difficulties of both a political and a technical nature. My delegation has held -- and still holds -- the view that the lack of political will and of a statesmanlike approach to the question on the part of the Western nuclear Powers is the main obstacle. The discussions in this Committee, particularly those held recently, have clearly indicated that all the talk about the necessity of having so-called "on-site inspections" in order to exercise control over the implementation of a comprehensive test ban is largely intended to serve as a specious excuse for that negative political stand. We believe that a political decision depends upon how soon the Western political and military circles will come to realize that the road to genuine security lies not through a continued nuclear rocketry build-up but through the reduction and eventual elimination of those means of mass destruction. It is regrettable that the belligerent circles in the West are adamantly opposed to precisely the way of thinking of those statesmen who realistically and soberly assess the present situation as a whole, and specifically the situation that has arisen as a result of the dangerous escalation of the arms race.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

26. The United States and the other Western Powers should display their readiness to meet the sincere desire of the socialist countries and other peace-loving forces to achieve concrete results with a view to attaining general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament. That would constitute a reasonable and sound step fully in conformity with the imperatives of our time.

27. The General Assembly of the United Nations, reflecting the anxiety of world public opinion over the mounting threat of a world-wide nuclear catastrophe, has in a number of resolutions urged this Committee to take up without delay the pressing problems of nuclear disarmament. In particular, General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII) has requested the Committee

"... to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-fourth session." (ENDC/237)

My delegation believes that the current session of the Committee should do its utmost in an attempt to respond to that urgent appeal, if not by elaborating a draft treaty then at least by taking certain concrete steps towards the implementation of that resolution.

28. It is our view that this year the Committee has more favourable opportunities to make such an attempt than in the past. In the files of our Committee we have quite an impressive number of documents relating to the question of banning underground nuclear tests that contain a number of constructive proposals and suggestions directed at the practical solution of this important problem. We have in mind above all the résumé of the report of the seismological research group of SIPRI (ENDC/230), the joint memoranda of the eight non-aligned nations (ENDC/28 and ENDC/235), the Swedish working paper (ENDC/242), and a number of others. In this connexion my delegation expresses its appreciation to the delegation of Sweden, which, with its characteristic constructive approach, has responded most aptly to the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly which I have mentioned. The working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests submitted by that delegation for the consideration of the Committee has to a great extent helped us to make our debate on this matter more concrete and purposeful.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

29. At this stage my delegation has no intention of giving a detailed analysis of this document. However, proceeding from our well-known position on the question of control over the implementation of a comprehensive test ban, I should like to comment briefly on paragraph 3 of article II of the possible provisions of a draft treaty. What this paragraph basically implies is the recognition of so-called on-site inspections "at invitation". We believe that the inclusion of this provision was prompted by the sincere desire of the author, so to say, to "build a bridge" between the two extremes in the position on the control question, that is, to find a generally-acceptable compromise for the speedy and positive solution of this problem. And yet we must keep in mind objective possibilities. The progress of science and technology in the field of seismology and the ever-increasing exchanges of seismological data clearly sustain the argument that the detection and identification of seismic events can be carried out without resorting to on-site inspection. This seriously questions the appropriateness of suggesting a compromise which is in fact tantamount to a retreat from the justified stand taken on the basis of objective findings of modern science and technology. Nevertheless, we believe that this document, coupled with other constructive proposals, may serve as a sound basis for the specific negotiations to be pursued with a view to elaborating a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

30. In this connexion members of the Committee will recall that we have before us the proposal of the United Arab Republic on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests above a threshold of yield with a magnitude of 4.75 accompanied by a moratorium accepted voluntarily by States on underground tests below that threshold (DC/PV.75, para. 134; ENDC/144, p.33).

31. Besides the proposals contained in the documents I have mentioned, a number of delegations, including those of Canada, Japan and others, have advanced ideas deserving careful study in the course of our deliberations on the question concerning the further improvement of the seismological methods of detection and identification. Since I have mentioned the recent intervention of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Asakai, I should like now to make a few preliminary remarks in that connexion. We have studied with great interest his suggestions concerning the preparation, so to say, of the scientific and technical basis for the realization of seismological control over the implementation of a future treaty (ENDC/PV.424, para. 39 et seq.). It seems

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

to us that these suggestions, as far as they are designed to promote the solution of the question of control without on-site inspection, deserve careful consideration. It may be said incidentally that these suggestions in a sense represent a further elaboration of the ideas put forward in the Joint Memorandum of 16 April 1962 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of this Committee (ENDC/28).

32. We should like to add, however, that measures like those proposed by the Japanese delegation -- regardless of who is the author -- will have full practical meaning and significance only when the banning of underground nuclear tests is accepted by all the nuclear States without exception. We hope the members of the Committee will understand that this is the feeling of the delegation of a country in whose immediate neighbourhood open nuclear tests are continuing to be carried out in gross violation of the partial test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

33. As for the proposal on the so-called workable formula to reach the ultimate goal of banning underground nuclear tests, I am sorry to say that it seems to us that it has been influenced in a way by the method of breaking the solution of important problems into parts or, so to say, into stages -- the method that, as we see it, has of late become somewhat fashionable in this Committee. I should like to state here that the apprehensions we expressed in connexion with a similar approach to another important problem on the agenda of this Committee remain basically the same in this case too.

34. That is a brief outline of my delegation's position on the most pressing problems of nuclear disarmament.

35. In conclusion I should like to assure the Committee that although my delegation has not touched on other questions of nuclear disarmament this in no way implies lack of interest on our part in those questions. We hope that we shall have other opportunities to express our views on them at a later date.

36. Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria): As this is the first time I have addressed the Committee formally at this resumed session I wish, first, to extend on behalf of my delegation a hearty welcome to our new co-Chairman, Ambassador Leonard of the United States of America. Allow me also to congratulate and welcome cordially on behalf of my delegation the eight delegations that have joined our Committee -- the delegation of Argentina led by Ambassador Dr. De Rozas, the delegation of Hungary led by Ambassador Dr. Kömives, the delegation of Japan led by Ambassador Asakai, the

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic led by Ambassador Dugersuren, the delegation of Morocco led by Ambassador Benhima, the delegation of the Netherlands led by Ambassador Eschauzier, the delegation of Pakistan led by Ambassador Shahi and the delegation of Yugoslavia led by Ambassador Vratusa. I wish also to welcome them personally because most of them have been my esteemed colleagues in other fields of our United Nations endeavours, and I am therefore acquainted with their high sense of devotion to their assignments. My delegation feels confident that each of the new members will make a valuable contribution towards the solution of the problems of which this Committee is seized, and we, for our part, assure them of our co-operation. Indeed, Nigeria maintains good relations with each of the new member States, and we were delighted to be informed of their admission to this Committee. As the record shows, however, my delegation is not so sure about the correctness of the procedure followed in admitting and seating new members.

37. At the beginning of the spring session this year practically all members of this Committee agreed that with the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), which in fact is hardly more than a measure to contain the present situation, we should give prior consideration to concrete measures of real nuclear disarmament and in particular to the banning of underground nuclear tests for weapons. It is a sad commentary that, in spite of our pious declarations and the excellent draft on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (ENDC/242) produced by the Swedish delegation, no doubt after a good deal of work and thought, the Committee has subsequently placed more emphasis on non-nuclear disarmament measures.

38. In a few weeks' time we shall be reporting back to the United Nations General Assembly and it appears that we not only shall have to submit a "no progress" report in the field of nuclear disarmament but also shall be unable to hold out any prospects of progress, because so far we seem to have reached a stalemate. This, to say the least, will be an unfortunate situation considering the sharp criticisms levelled against this Committee last year by the General Assembly and the emphasis it placed in its resolution 2454 B (XXIII) (ENDC/237) on the need for the Committee to give urgent attention to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament tends to nullify the high hopes engendered by the non-proliferation Treaty and even to violate one of its most important provisions -- article VI. As I

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

said in my statement (ENDC/PV.396, paras. 3, et seq.) in the Committee on 20 March, the non-proliferation Treaty is essentially the "disarming of the non-armed" and the obligations of article VI constitute, on the part of the nuclear Powers, a balance to the commitments which the non-nuclear States have voluntarily accepted under the Treaty. In fact, as far as my delegation is concerned, article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty is, as it were, the *raison d'être* of the Treaty and its implementation is indispensable to the wider acceptance and effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty.

39. It is therefore a matter of deep regret to my delegation that the Swedish proposal regarding a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as other proposals in this respect, have not received a greater degree of priority. As members of this Committee we should all bear some measure of responsibility for this state of affairs, but of course we all know that in practice progress in this subject, as in other matters of nuclear disarmament, depends mainly on the super-Powers. We others, and particularly the so-called non-aligned countries, endeavour to put pressure on the super-Powers to accommodate each other, but beyond this there is little else we can do. In this connexion I am obliged to refer once again to the unfulfilled promise of bilateral talks, which I believe may be the key to a wider spectrum of agreement on nuclear disarmament. It is sad that up till now no definite date has yet been announced for the commencement of those talks. We think, however, that the international political situation is now opportune for them and we hope that they will start before this Committee adjourns.

40. Although we think that the commencement of the bilateral talks is an important element in ensuring rapid progress in nuclear disarmament, we still believe that the Committee can make some progress in the meantime on a comprehensive test ban, given the political will and readiness to reach a compromise on the difficult problem of verification. I sincerely urge the Committee to give serious consideration within the short time available to us to the Swedish and other proposals we have had on a comprehensive test ban. I wish to refer also to the working paper (ENDC/246) which I submitted at the spring session and which is in a way similar to, but yet we believe perhaps an improvement on, the United Kingdom proposal contained in ENDC/232. I am glad that the representative of the United Kingdom remarked at one of our informal meetings that his Government was giving consideration to this proposal, but as with

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

other matters concerning nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive test ban in particular not much has been said about it by either of the super-Powers since then. The same consideration, we believe, should go to the Canadian and United States working papers (ENDC/251/Rev.1, ENDC/252), aimed respectively at evolving a framework for an organized and effective world-wide seismological data-exchange and at making experimental explosions for that purpose. We hope also that due consideration will eventually be given to the question of the cut-off and reduction of stockpiled fissionable material, about which certain proposals have been made in this Committee.

41. I now wish to express a few thoughts on the two subjects which appear to have occupied our main attention during this session -- that is, the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and chemical and biological warfare.

42. I will deal first with the question of the sea-bed. In doing so I shall, like the representative of Sweden and a few other colleagues, discuss the subject under three sub-headings: (a) the scope of prohibition; (b) the area of prohibition; and (c) verification or control.

43. Speaking about the scope of prohibition in my statement of 15 May, I said:

"Our own assessment of the general feeling expressed during the discussion of the sea-bed question in the General Assembly and of the spirit of the resolution adopted is that the sea-bed should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes." (ENDC/PV.411, para. 17)

I went on to say that my delegation was therefore of the view that the prohibition which any such treaty might provide should encompass all military installations.

44. But since I made that statement the United States delegation has not only elaborated on its proposal for a prohibition limited to weapons of mass destruction but has also submitted an alternative draft treaty (ENDC/249) to that submitted by the USSR (ENDC/240). While it appreciates some of the arguments advanced by the United States delegation in support of its view, my delegation remains unconverted. In his statement on 22 July the representative of the United States said:

"It is our belief, however, that realistic possibilities do not now and will not soon exist for conventional military uses of the sea-bed that would be threatening to the territories of States. Nor do we believe that there are non-nuclear military uses of the sea-bed that could in the next few years trigger an arms race." (ENDC/PV.421, para. 35)

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

The whole exercise relating to the sea-bed is more a preventive exercise than one meant to meet an existing or immediate danger. Extended to its logical conclusion, the United States argument against the prohibition of non-nuclear weapons could be advanced equally against the prohibition of nuclear weapons, since the possibility of emplacing such weapons on the sea-bed does not actually exist now and may take some time to evolve. If, however, we are determined to prevent a possible nuclear arms race on the sea-bed, we should by the same token take steps to prevent every type of arms race. This is particularly pertinent since our ultimate goal in this Committee is not only nuclear disarmament but general and complete disarmament, which alone can ensure the safety of future generations from the scourge of war.

45. In the speech to which I have already referred the United States representative, Ambassador Leonard, went on further to cite the need for security devices for the detection and surveillance of submarines in support of his case for a more restricted prohibition (ibid., para. 36). Of course, every government has an obligation to its State and people to ensure security. Indeed, there is, I think, a good case for the exemption of defensive weapons from the prohibition. But, valid as that may be, I think that perhaps my colleague overstated his case by concluding that the prohibition should therefore encompass nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction only. It is in appreciation of the need for state rights in regard to security that my delegation, in a statement made on 15 May, said:

"... we would see no harm in exempting from such a prohibition defensive detection installations which are not in themselves weapons capable of mass destruction..." (ENDC/PV.411, para. 17)

I am glad that some delegations have repeated this view. In particular I would refer to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal who, in her statement on 24 July expressed my delegation's concept perhaps more succinctly when she said:

"It should in principle extend to all weapons, and to military bases and fortifications and to other installations and structures of a military nature fixed on or in the sea-bed and the ocean floor, some exceptions being made, however, for devices which are of a purely passive defensive character, such as means of communication, navigation and supervision."

(ENDC/PV.422, para. 40)

This exception should take care of the misgivings expressed by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Leonard, and we believe it also very much weakens his

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

argument that the prohibition of military installations on the sea-bed should, for security reasons, be limited to weapons of mass destruction.

46. Again, in his statement on 22 July the United States representative referred to the possibility of using the review conference provided for in the United States draft to determine additional military installations which should be prohibited under the proposed treaty (ENDC/PV.421, para. 38). While my delegation appreciates fully the value of such a conference, we think however that it cannot properly serve the purpose outlined. In the first place, such a review conference, as we see it, should not deal with a fundamental issue concerning a re-negotiation of the treaty and the question of additional prohibitions we would regard as fundamental. In any case, as previous speakers in this Committee have remarked, our experience of the partial test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) proves how uncertain the prospect of further reinforcement negotiations on disarmament can be. The United States representative argues that we should have a partial prohibition now in the hope that in years to come a more comprehensive prohibition could be established, but we all know that in the case of the partial test ban we have not been able up until today to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. The possibilities are that between the conclusion of the proposed treaty and the first review conference there might be technological developments -- as in the case of underground tests -- which would make additional prohibitions very difficult and perhaps impossible to negotiate. My delegation feels therefore that, rather than take the chance of a hope which might never be fulfilled, we should conclude a treaty now which prohibits all offensive military installations on the sea-bed.

47. I have so far been speaking about the scope of prohibition. I wish now to say a few words about the area of prohibition. The United States has proposed a three-mile maritime zone beyond which the installation of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited. On the other hand, the USSR has proposed a twelve-mile maritime zone. I have said that Nigeria would like to see the widest possible area of the sea-bed used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We think, however, that in spite of this basic principle due consideration must be given to the security and sovereign rights of coastal States. It is our considered view, therefore, that these various considerations are better served by the USSR proposal than by that submitted by the United States -- in other words, we consider that a twelve-mile limit will be more appropriate and more likely to be acceptable to all than a smaller area.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

48. We congratulate the Swedish delegation for the thought it has put into finding a compromise solution to this problem. However, we think that the three-tier system suggested by Sweden is rather complicated, and would raise a lot of problems in practice. I had said previously that we had no objection to purely defensive detection installations on the sea-bed. I should add, however, that such installations should be within a specified area, because otherwise every State will be free to set up such installations anywhere. In fact, if there is no definition of the area within which the installations could be set up, there is nothing in theory to prevent another State from allegedly setting up its installation just outside the maritime zone of another State. Such a situation would, of course, be undesirable. We agree therefore with the concept of a defensive zone as proposed by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff (ENDC/PV.410, para.9; 424, para.23). We think, however, that the 200 miles proposed by Ambassador Ignatieff is perhaps too wide and we would suggest a shorter distance of, say, about fifty miles.

49. The proposal of the representative of Japan that there should be no maritime zone as such but that the whole of the sea-bed should be free from nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (ENDC/PV.420, para. 14) is attractive. Ambassador Asakai himself has, however, pointed out the problem regarding verification which his proposal might create: (ibid., paras. 16-18). We feel that, the question of verification apart, the Japanese proposal would leave the sea-bed free for all for the installation of conventional weapons. We would prefer a modification of the Japanese proposal by the inclusion of a prohibition on even conventional weapon installations beyond an agreed maritime zone of every State.

50. On the question of verification, we have had two distinct proposals. The Soviet Union has proposed free access to all installations beyond the maritime zone on the basis of "reciprocity" (ENDC/240 article 2). The United States, on the other hand, has proposed that there should be free observation by all parties of installations, but further measures of verification such as access to the installation could only be undertaken after consultation between the parties involved (ENDC/249 article III, para.1). We, for our part, see great merit in the Soviet proposal. In fact, the right of observation which the United States proposal purports to give every State is a right which already exists in international law. In other words, the United States proposal does no more than confirm an existing right. We think that the question of verification or control should go beyond the existing right of every State under

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

international law. Therefore, while supporting the Soviet proposal in principle, we do not consider the word "reciprocity" used in the Soviet draft to be appropriate, since it may be construed to imply an exchange of inspections by those who have installations on the sea-bed.

51. As I said in my statement of 15 May:

"Each party to the treaty, whether or not it has the capability for verification through national means, should have the right of verification." (ENDC/PV.411, para.19)

In this connexion I believe that a proposal was made by a number of countries, including Nigeria, at one of our informal meetings during the spring session. The proposal was intended to improve on the implication of the word "reciprocity" in the Soviet draft. It was further suggested at that time that international arrangements for verification might be made. That latter suggestion, it appears to us, has been misunderstood by some of our colleagues here. The proposal of the delegations -- certainly that of my delegation -- did not suggest that an international arrangement for verification should be automatically introduced. All that was being sought was that those at present incapable of undertaking such verification themselves should be able to call upon a friendly country, a party to the treaty, to assist in verification, or to call upon an organization if and when it became possible to have such an organization. As we understand it, if one country sought the assistance of another country there would be no obligation on the country so requested to undertake the task.

52. Before I end my speech I wish to touch briefly on the question of chemical and biological warfare. We are most grateful to the United Kingdom for the draft convention it has submitted on biological warfare (ENDC/255). We are, however, in agreement with the consensus in this Committee that chemical and biological warfare should be taken together, and not separately as proposed by the United Kingdom. We are impressed by the arguments which the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Mulley, put forward in support of his case (ENDC/PV.418, paras. 13-16). We are convinced, however, from both the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/7575) and the Pugwash Conference Report that the line of distinction between chemical and biological warfare is thin, and probably non-existent in some cases. To that extent we feel that the two methods of warfare should be treated together.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

53. Furthermore, it has been admitted that the development of chemical warfare is more advanced than that of biological warfare. The United Kingdom proposal, which is limited to biological warfare, almost gives one the impression that this is another attempt on the part of the big Powers -- if I may be permitted to quote this over-used phrase once again -- "to disarm the unarmed". One would have thought that if it were necessary to tackle these weapons of warfare one at a time it would be more expedient to tackle chemical means of warfare first, since the possibility of using them is more probable.

54. We support, in general, the recommendations of the Secretary-General and believe that the first and most essential thing is for countries that have not so far acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (*ibid.* p.117) to do so. We would go even further and suggest an appeal to those countries that have acceded to the Protocol but with reservations to consider the withdrawal of those reservations. We appreciate that in spite of all this there would still remain open the question of interpretation of the scope of coverage of the 1925 Geneva Protocol itself in relation to all existing and future chemical, bacteriological and biological agents.

55. We are aware also that even apart from the question of interpretation the Geneva Protocol does not cover the important field of production or acquisition of those weapons of warfare. It is our view, therefore, that some temporary arrangement which would provide the moral pressure on countries to desist from taking advantage of the weakness of the Geneva Protocol should be instituted, and it might be that a United Nations General Assembly resolution would provide the answer in that connexion. I use the word "temporary", since it would still be necessary for us to pursue the question of providing the support which the 1925 Geneva Protocol requires to make it an effective instrument for the prevention of chemical and biological warfare.

56. We wish here to commend the United Kingdom draft, which deals with one aspect -- biological warfare -- and also covers some of the points upon which the Geneva Protocol has remained silent. We would suggest as our long-term objective either suitable amendments to the United Kingdom draft which would cover chemical warfare, or the simultaneous consideration of a draft, similar to that of the United Kingdom, dealing with chemical warfare. It is our belief that the former would be more appropriate.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): First of all I should like to express my delegation's sincere thanks to the delegations that have been kind enough to welcome the new members of the Committee. We have been very much impressed by the kind words and good wishes extended to us and we can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we shall work in this Committee in such a spirit as to fulfil the hopes expressed concerning the enlargement of the Committee.

58. At the meeting of the Committee on 7 August my delegation set out in general terms the standpoint of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic concerning the question of disarmament, and emphasized the importance that my Government attaches to the activities of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/PV.426). On the present occasion, before the conclusion of the summer session of the Committee, I should like to expound my Government's position concerning the main issues before the Committee. While dealing with the individual questions I should like at the same time to express some ideas that might help in solving the problems on the agenda of the Committee. It is clear to all of us that the solution of those problems would positively affect the international situation and result in opening wide perspectives for concluding new agreements and arriving at new results.

59. Studying the material of the summer session it can be stated that the question of prohibiting the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor has received the greatest attention. The live debate and the wide exchange of opinions that have developed in the Committee concerning this question reflect the importance attached to it by the members of the Committee. My delegation considers that the attention paid and the importance attributed to the problem by the Committee are completely justified, since the rapid development of science and technology in this field from exploring and exploiting the depths of oceans might open up so far unknown perspectives for the benefit of mankind. But, unfortunately, the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor could create new dangers, a new field for the arms race, a new cause for increasing international tensions. I think that the lofty task of our Committee consists in excluding the latter by reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

60. The fact that the Hungarian People's Republic is a land-locked country does not at all minimize my Government's interest in and concern over this problem. The use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor might threaten both the countries

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

having sea-shores and the land-locked countries alike. My country, therefore, wishes to be freed from the possible consequences of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor just like any coastal State. On the other hand, in the framework of international co-operation my country would also like to share the benefits deriving from the exploration and the exploitation of the depths of the oceans.

61. The vital importance and urgency of the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed are clearly demonstrated by the fact that both the Soviet and the United States delegations have submitted their draft treaties for consideration (ENDC/240; 249). Concerning the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor it is the opinion of my Government that the scope of the ban should be as broad as possible: that is to say, it should incorporate not only the prohibition of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction but other weapons as well, and the area to be covered by the treaty should be as wide as possible. We consider that the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet delegation meets these requirements, and my delegation supports this draft.

62. At this juncture my delegation would like to express its hope that the Committee's further work will lead to the solution of this extremely important and urgent problem. We are expressing this hope because the discussions so far have clarified the problems involved and in this way have helped to pave the way for further and specific negotiations in order to reach an agreement on a treaty.

63. Turning to the other major issue before the Committee, to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare, I would like to go back briefly to the history of the problem. At the turn of the century there was only a mere supposition that the new achievements and inventions of science and technology could lead to the production of weapons the destructive force of which would far outstrip that of the then known "conventional" weapons. At the time of the Hague Conferences, in spite of the war preparations, resolutions were elaborated aimed at prohibiting the use of these new weapons.

64. In their declaration the participants in the Conferences prohibited the use of projectiles the only aim of which was to spread suffocating or poisonous gases. The production of such weapons was, at that time, imagined rather than known; nevertheless, the participants in the Conferences were already guided by the consideration that the

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

civilian population had to be freed from the dangers inherent in these weapons, since their effects could not be confined to the military forces only.

65. Despite this, gas bombs were used during the First World War. That made it inevitable for questions of chemical warfare to be dealt with at a later international forum. This is how the Geneva Protocol (A/7575, p.117) was arrived at on 17 June 1925; its signatories declared that since the civilized world condemned with full authority the use of chemical means of warfare, they accepted this prohibition and extended it also to the use of bacteriological means of warfare.

66. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are among the most inhuman means of warfare. They afflict both the military and the civilian population, they have a deadly effect on the human environment, and their consequences might be felt during generations. For all these reasons, on the basis of valid international agreements and rules of customary international law, it can be stated that the use of such weapons would be contrary to international law and would qualify as a war crime even in the case of countries which had not ratified the Geneva Protocol or did not accede to it.

67. The Secretary-General's relevant report (A/7575), in the preparation of which Dr. Tibor Bakáts, Professor of Hygiene, Director-General of the Hungarian National Institute of Public Health, also participated as a consultant expert, pays special attention to the dangers inherent in chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare. The Hungarian delegation supports the appeal of Secretary-General U Thant in which he called upon all countries

"... to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons." (ibid., p.xii)

68. The Hungarian delegation has thoroughly studied and followed with the greatest attention the discussion of the Committee on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. We highly esteem the importance attributed by the members of the Committee to this important and urgent question. My delegation has to note, however, that there are different approaches to the solution of the problem. One of them aims to settle this question in a comprehensive way on the basis of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

and its general acceptance; the other -- which is reflected in the draft convention submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255) -- would concentrate only on the question of bacteriological (biological) warfare.

69. My delegation has no doubt about the good intentions of the United Kingdom delegation in submitting its draft, but it is of the opinion that a combined approach is necessary to the ban on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- all the more so because they have more common than divergent features, because they are generally treated together, and finally, because the most important international instrument, the Geneva Protocol -- to which Hungary adhered in 1952 -- covers both of them.

70. My delegation, together with others, is of the opinion that at present the most urgent and important task, in keeping with resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/237), is to reinforce the already formulated international legal norms, which have historical significance, by ratifying or acceding to the Geneva Protocol. The Hungarian delegation shares the opinion of the Polish delegation expressed in document ENDC/256 according to which the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use could serve as a basis for further discussions in the Committee.

71. The Hungarian delegation also supports the proposal of the delegation of Mongolia put forward at the Committee's meeting on 31 July that the Committee should issue an appeal to States not parties to the Geneva Protocol to ratify or accede to that important international instrument before its forty-fifth anniversary -- that is, before 17 June 1970 (ENDC/PV.424, para.105).

72. For these reasons my delegation welcomes the statement of the delegation of Japan made by Ambassador Asakai at the meeting of the Committee on 14 August in which he said that Japan would consider the ratification of the Geneva Protocol to be "a manifestation of the earnest and strong desire of the people of Japan to eliminate these dreadful weapons completely from the earth." (ENDC/PV.428, para.49)

73. One of the most important questions before the Committee is the cessation of underground nuclear tests and the attainment in this way of a comprehensive test ban. My Government attaches great importance to this question, since it considers that an

(Mr. Kőmives, Hungary)

agreement in this field would constitute a big step towards complete nuclear disarmament and would have a positive effect on the whole international situation. After signing the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) in 1963 we all had high expectations concerning the early conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. Those expectations of ours and of others were further strengthened by the fact that the partial test-ban Treaty contains provisions for attaining a comprehensive test ban.

74. In connexion with the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests the problem of control and in particular the problem of on-site inspection are much debated questions. My delegation has followed with great interest and attention the statements of a number of delegations, requiring much work and preparatory studies, which have attached great importance to the international exchange of seismic data, considering that this might contribute to the conclusion of an agreement concerning the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. My Government is of the opinion that the solution of the problem is to be looked for, not in the technical execution of the control, but in the intention and the resolution of the interested Powers regarding their readiness to cease to conduct underground tests. This is all the more true because the strict observance of a future agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear tests could be controlled adequately by national seismological means.

75. In the field of eliminating the possibility of a nuclear war the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a very important step along the road leading to general and complete disarmament. My Government considers this problem to be ripe for solution and for this reason it, together with the Governments of a number of other States, deems it important and urgent that the Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly on the prohibition of the use of such weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)) should soon become a generally-acknowledged and binding international treaty. My delegation believes that our Committee should do everything in its power towards the elaboration of such an international legal instrument. My delegation considers also that the memorandum put forward by the Soviet Union (ENDC/227) could serve as a good basis for this.

76. One of the greatest results of the work of this Committee was the elaboration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic supported from the beginning the idea and the plan of that Treaty because it considered it to be a suitable means of slowing down the arms

(Mr. Kónives, Hungary)

race and reducing the danger of a thermonuclear war. That is why the Hungarian People's Republic was among the first to sign and ratify that Treaty. My Government is convinced that at this time efforts must be made to ensure that as many States as possible sign and ratify that Treaty in order that it may enter into force without any further delay. The entry into force of the Treaty will be an important milestone in the slowing down of the arms race, and the universal application and strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty will lessen the danger of a thermonuclear war.

77. Before concluding my statement I should like to deal with the question of general and complete disarmament, which is our ultimate goal and one of the main sources of our renewed efforts and strivings to attain, step by step, partial but at the same time very important agreements. It is the opinion of my delegation that there is a direct link between partial disarmament measures and general and complete disarmament. We consider that any partial solution could pave the way towards general and complete disarmament and that, on the other hand, the objective of general and complete disarmament helps us to arrive at partial measures. While dealing with the question of general and complete disarmament I have to state, however, that on the way to the great perspectives to be opened up by the implementation of general and complete disarmament there are still factors and forces interested in continuing and speeding up the arms race. The attainment of the objective of general and complete disarmament therefore requires further great efforts.

78. One can state with pleasure that the idea of general and complete disarmament as an aim is gaining ground. It is included in a number of General Assembly resolutions and in the international treaties aiming at its implementation. In line with the provisions of Article 11 of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly dealt with the question of disarmament at its first session, and its resolution in this connexion adopted on 14 December 1946 stated that the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces was an urgent necessity (resolution 41 (I)). Succeeding sessions of the General Assembly adopted similar resolutions, and on 20 November 1959 it stated that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today" (General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV)), and invited the governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of that problem.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

79. The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) submitted in September 1961 by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to the General Assembly of the United Nations is a basis for attaining the objective of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

80. In the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the general desire of the contracting parties has been clearly expressed in the following words:

"... to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

(ENDC/226*)

81. The idea of disarmament has been a constant and living problem at international conferences for more than half a century. There exists hardly any objective the attainment of which is more strongly desired by the peoples than is the objective of general and complete disarmament. The Hungarian delegation wishes to continue its activities in the Committee by trying to contribute to the realization of that objective, desired by the Hungarian people and expressed by the National Assembly of the Hungarian People's Republic in one of its resolutions adopted more than a decade ago, which said:

"Our progress in the way of lasting peace, towards general and complete disarmament, towards the final elimination of war, will substantially influence the fate of the present and future generations."

82. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia): This year the Committee has dealt with a number of concrete projects and proposals among which the question of preventing an armaments race on the sea-bed has received serious attention. I should like today to express briefly the views of the Ethiopian delegation on some of the main aspects pertaining to these relatively new measures of disarmament.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

83. Before I do so, however, I should like first, at the express instruction of my Government, to welcome the new members of this Committee, the representatives of Japan and Mongolia, and those of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. Their presence here will further strengthen the political and geographical balance of the Committee. Their influence and contribution will no doubt help to promote the important work of the Committee on disarmament. As to the procedures followed to enlarge the membership of the Committee outside the framework of the General Assembly, my delegation, like others, would wish to record its concern.

84. Having said that, I shall now proceed directly to the subject matter of my statement. It has now become a common formula to treat the question of the sea-bed under three sub-headings: the scope of prohibition, the area of prohibition and the methods of verification. I shall proceed to examine the issues raised under those sub-headings.

85. In an environment where the total surface of the sea and ocean and the water underneath is open to an unrestricted armaments race, the present proposal to demilitarize the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof can be regarded only as a partial measure. In addition to this fact, here in the Committee we are confronted with a choice between a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor as embodied in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/240) submitted to this Committee at the beginning of our spring session, and a "limited" approach as suggested in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/249) prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor.

86. With respect to the Soviet draft treaty, my delegation has already given its support in principle to the basic concept of a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed as found in the first article of that draft treaty. Since then a number of delegations -- including the authors of the two draft treaties -- have offered important arguments in support of one or other approach. My delegation has carefully listened to and studied those arguments. On balance, however, my delegation found no persuasive argument for changing its previous stand on the basic approach of a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

87. In the main, the arguments for the limited approach towards prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and, by implication, against the complete prohibition of the sea-bed and ocean floor for all military purposes, fall into two categories. They are arguments related to verification, and arguments relative to the security of maritime nations.

88. It has been argued in this Committee that a comprehensive treaty prohibiting the use of the sea-bed for military purposes will raise serious problems of verification. It is assumed by this argument that verification would be cumbersome and, in fact, impossible to carry out over the vast space of the sea, and might therefore lead to undetected clandestine use of the sea-bed for some military purpose. On the contrary, violation of a treaty designed to prohibit the use of the sea-bed for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction could be easily detected and verified, since the emplacement of these weapons on the sea-bed would naturally require greater activity which could not escape the scrutiny of the sea-bed by other nations.

89. This point of view would seem to us to overlook the fact that, in the event of a prohibition limited to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, verification will be far more complicated. It will be essential to identify clearly any suspicious event on the sea-bed, whether it involves a prohibited weapon or not. In doing so -- as the representative of the Soviet Union pointed out at our meeting of 3 April -- the question of revealing the military secrets of the States concerned would create further complications (ENDC/PV.400, para.26).

90. In the second category of argument the most important issue of the security of States is involved. A complete demilitarization of the sea-bed would, it is said, leave maritime nations without legitimate defence, as they would be prohibited from emplacing defensive military installations on the sea-bed to detect any approaching hostile element. It is to alleviate this legitimate concern of States for their security that several members of our Committee have put forward a number of suggestions.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

91. In the first place, it is considered by some States that a twelve-mile limit of the territorial seas of the coastal States is broad enough to allow States to install on the sea-bed devices -- military or otherwise -- that would enable them to detect any element approaching their shores. In addition, it is normally assumed that a nation that is capable of implanting detective devices on the sea-bed of its coastline is also capable of disposing of some ships and submarines which would further augment its detective ability.

92. Nevertheless, that alone does not seem to give sufficient security assurance for a number of coastal States, particularly non-nuclear-weapon States, and that is why it would seem to be essential for this Committee to search for a further device to minimize the security risk that would arise from a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. In this connexion we already have a number of suggestions formulated by other delegations. My delegation is particularly attracted by the suggestion put forward by the Canadian delegation for the creation of a defensive zone extending 200 or more miles from the outer limits of the twelve-mile band (ENDC/PV.410, para. 9). My delegation has studied the various aspects of that important proposal and found it to be worthy of serious consideration.

93. It may be difficult, if not impossible, as some delegations have argued, to enumerate all the prohibited weapons and activities on the sea-bed, as suggested, again, by the Canadian delegation (ibid., para. 5). On the other hand, so long as some nations feel that a twelve-mile limit is an area insufficient to ensure their security, the alternative would seem to be the enumeration of certain purely defensive military mechanisms whose emplacement on the sea-bed by the coastal States within a given distance, not exceeding 200 miles starting from the outer limits of the twelve-mile area, would be tolerated. Such activity would be open to verification, and only the coastal States would be authorized to carry out limited defensive activities on the sea-bed.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

94. I turn now to the area of prohibition.

95. With respect to the question of the area to which the proposed prohibition would apply, there seem to emerge from the discussions so far two widely-upheld views. The first is that the area to be covered by the treaty should be as large as possible, and the second is that whatever limit might be agreed upon would be established on the understanding that it would apply only for the purpose of the treaty on the sea-bed, without prejudice to the other unsettled question of territorial waters. On those points, especially the second, paragraph 3 of article II of the United States draft treaty is unequivocally clear. We wish to commend a similar approach in drafting for the Soviet text.

96. The real issue in this case, however, revolves around the limit of the maritime zone to be set up in the treaty. There is the twelve-mile zone proposal of the Soviet Union and the three-mile zone proposal of the United States. In the first place, the determination of the width of the maritime zone of the coastal States is in our opinion dependent upon the type or the scope of prohibition that would be agreed upon. In the case of a general prohibition of all military activities on the sea-bed, including the emplacement of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, a twelve-mile limit becomes the minimum area requirement for coastal States to allow them to carry out some defensive activities in order to ensure their security. The same cannot be said to apply in the case of a limited treaty intended to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as there would be no limitation on the emplacement of other military devices on the sea-bed.

97. In the course of the discussion in the Committee so far it has become clear that there is a general tendency in favour of a twelve-mile limit. My delegation shares that point of view. While we welcome the fact that whatever limit may eventually be agreed upon for the purpose of the present treaty is to be established with the understanding that it will be strictly applicable for the purposes of the treaty

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

without prejudice to other claims concerning territorial waters or any other questions of an international nature, we cannot ignore the reality that a large number of States have already indicated a preference for a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters. We feel that a treaty on the prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed should not, now or later, come into conflict with the complicated question of territorial waters, which belongs in other forums of negotiation.

98. With respect to the question of verification, my delegation has listened very carefully to the various points of view expressed in this Committee and noted the importance attached to it. Indeed, like all preventive measures of disarmament, a treaty on the demilitarization of the sea-bed should provide for an adequate verification method. In general we feel that the solution to the verification problem in this case should be based on the reaffirmation of the existing rights of observation of activities on the high seas established under a different body of international law applicable to the high seas, and on guaranteed access to the actual activities or emplacements on the sea-bed by all States parties to the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

99. In formulating a provision that would reasonably ensure access to all activities on the sea-bed by all the parties to the treaty, thought must be given to the fact that not many States are in a position technologically to carry out verification activities on the sea-bed. That is why my delegation fully supports the proposal that each party to the treaty should have the right to carry out verification with the full or partial assistance of other States and, when it became feasible, through an international organization or arrangement. In that respect we welcome also the suggestion made by the Canadian delegation at our meeting of 31 July concerning the right of every party "to apply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the co-operation and assistance of other States in carrying out the verification process." (ENDC/PV.424, para. 29)

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

100. In conclusion I should like to state that the discussion on the question of the sea-bed has so far been very enlightening and fruitful. We therefore wonder whether, in the light of this important exchange of views, it would not be an opportune time for the co-Chairmen to begin work on joint draft articles on areas of major agreement, leaving blank, if necessary, articles on areas of difference.

101. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): I have asked to speak, Mr. Chairman, to announce the presentation of a working paper which my delegation has formally submitted today and which will be circulated as soon as possible.^{1/} The subject-matter of that working paper is not new to the Committee, since I dealt with it at some length in my statement of 29 July (ENDC/PV.423, paras. 67 et seq.). It has also been taken up by the delegations of Canada (ENDC/PV.424, paras. 27 et seq.) and India (ENDC/PV.428, para. 2 et seq.). It deals with one particular aspect of the control provisions of a future treaty on the non-armament of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, namely the role that the coastal States should play whenever verification activities are to take place in waters subjacent to its continental shelf.

102. The working paper rests on two fundamental premises: first, the coastal State must have sufficient guarantees that its juridical rights and security and its political and economic interests are not infringed, jeopardized or harmed, directly or indirectly, as a consequence of its adherence to a non-armament treaty covering the sea-bed and ocean floor; second, the utilization of the system of control for this treaty should not be unduly invoked as a justification for acts that could actually violate established rights recognized under international law.

103. We also have as an essential starting-point the indisputable fact that great disparities in the development of marine technology exist today, and will continue into the foreseeable future, among potential parties to a non-armaments treaty covering the sea-bed and ocean floor. This fact must be viewed in conjunction with the two premises I have set forth. We feel that the interests of medium and small nations should be fully taken into consideration when an international treaty of this importance is being negotiated if those nations are to play any significant role in its implementation.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/264

(Mr. Frazão, Brazil)

104. Those are the main considerations that have led the Brazilian delegation to submit a working paper on this matter. In doing so we were guided by a spirit of constructive co-operation. By refraining from presenting specific amendments at this stage we are conforming to the present state of negotiations on this matter. We should, however, be fully prepared to submit proposals in appropriate treaty terminology whenever the moment for considering a single basic text should arise.

105. That being said, I wish to summarize our main operative suggestions. A coastal State should have timely and precise information on the carrying out of verification procedures that go beyond what can be considered to be normal and simple navigation or over-flight of waters that are superjacent to its continental shelf. In other words, a coastal State should be given due advance notification of the intention of any party to the treaty to conduct extensive control activities in waters adjacent to or on its continental shelf. This is designed to enable the coastal State to participate in those operations. It should not be construed to mean that the coastal State has the power directly or indirectly to delay or unnecessarily limit in any way verification activities which are prescribed and justified by a treaty on the non-armament of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

Concurrently, no infringement should derive therefrom of rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas.

106. As I have already said, the Brazilian delegation wishes to present today only general concerns and suggestions regarding what it considers to be a most relevant problem, but it is prepared to discuss specific formulations for these generic positions. It is my earnest hope that the ideas of the working paper I am submitting today will be carefully pondered and eventually incorporated in the treaty on the non-armament of the sea-bed and ocean floor that we all wish to conclude within the shortest possible time.

107. The CHAIRMAN (Argentina) (translation from Spanish): - I have a statement from the co-Chairmen which I will read out:

"Having considered the comments of members following the 427th plenary meeting and the suggestions received in subsequent consultations, the co-Chairmen would like to report that the possible new name for this body which appears to be most broadly acceptable to most members is 'The Committee on Disarmament'. The co-Chairmen suggest, therefore, that this be the new name used by this Conference.

"The co-Chairmen would also like to note that, since with the new name Committee documents will be labelled 'Conference of the Committee on Disarmament', it would seem appropriate that the initials 'CCD' replace 'ENDC' as the new abbreviation."

Are there any comments?

108. Since there are no comments, I shall read out the communiqué.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 430th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, representative of Argentina.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria, Hungary, Ethiopia, Brazil and the Chairman.

"The delegation of Italy submitted a document containing the statement by Ambassador R. Caracciolo at the informal meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 20 August 1969 (ENDC/263).

"The delegation of Brazil submitted a working paper on the Control Provisions for a Treaty on the Non-Armament of the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor (ENDC/264).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 26 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

